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ABSTRACT 
The division of responsibilities in the regulation and supervision of 
financial markets between ‘public’ regulatory agencies and ‘private’ 
market actors is not fixed, but it has radically changed across time. 
This paper argues that the financial crisis of 2007-09 has triggered 
the latest turn in the ‘public-private’ divide in the regulation of 
finance. Focusing in particular on the extensive reforms that have 
been introduced internationally in the regulation of OTC derivatives, 
credit rating agencies, and hedge funds, this paper argues that the 
response to the financial crisis has brought to a halt the reliance on 
self-regulation and market discipline as primary regulatory 
mechanisms that had characterized the approach of regulators prior 
to the crisis. However, while public regulatory agencies have 
consolidated in their hands the authority to regulate and oversee 
markets previously left outside their regulatory oversight, the content 
and the purpose of their regulatory intervention continue to present 
significant element of continuity with the pre-crisis regulatory 
paradigm. 
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I. Introduction 
Who governs the global financial markets? Most debates on the regulation of financial 
markets are informed by the implicit assumption that a clear division of roles exists 
between ‘regulators’ and a ‘regulatees’. The responsibility to regulate and oversee the 
activities of private market actors is often described as naturally falling in the hands of 
the state, which delegates this function to regulatory agencies often coordinating their 
regulatory policies at the international level. Contrary to this perception, the division of 
responsibilities in the regulation and supervision of financial markets between ‘public’ 
regulatory agencies and ‘private’ market actors (hereinafter public-private divide) is not 
fixed, but it has radically changed across historical periods, countries, and financial 
sectors.  
This paper argues that the global financial crisis, which erupted in the summer of 2007 
from the US housing market, has triggered the latest significant turn in the public-private 
divide in regulation of finance. The crisis has spurred heated debates among regulators, 
lawmakers, and financial industry representatives over the gaps that have been revealed 
in the international financial regulatory architecture.2 A second issue of contention has 
been whether these gaps should be addressed through the intervention of public 
regulators or whether the private sector should be given first the opportunity to correct its 
own mistakes.  What has been the impact of the financial crisis on how the responsibility 
to regulate and oversee financial markets is divided between public regulatory agencies 
and private market actors?  
By examining the extensive reforms in the regulation of OTC derivatives, credit rating 
agencies, and hedge funds that have been coordinated at the international level, the 
argument presented in this paper is that the crisis has halted the shift in the public-private 
divide that had taken place over the previous fifteen years or so. During that period, 
international and European regulatory bodies opposed measures to bring OTC derivatives 
markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds within the perimeter of their regulatory 
oversight. Instead, they preferred to shift important regulatory functions to private market 
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actors, granting a public policy role to industry-driven self-regulatory measures, and 
directing the ‘visible hand’ of regulation to the purpose of harness the ‘invisible hand’ of 
market discipline.  
This shift in the public-private divide had attracted the attention of numerous scholars, 
who have investigated its origins. While presenting different explanations, most of these 
works shared the tendency to regard the delegation of regulatory responsibility to private 
market actors in finance as a rising trend. The possibility that this trend could be reversed 
and public regulatory authorities could in the future seize back the authority they had 
delegate to the markets was only rarely discussed.3 
To the surprise of many observers, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has led international 
regulatory authorities to endorse measures to bring under the regulatory oversight of 
public regulators markets and institutions that had been left outside of their jurisdiction. 
Public regulatory agencies in Europe, US, and elsewhere have taken upon themselves the 
task of monitoring and sanctioning the implementation of financial standards that had 
been left to the market discipline. They have questioned the capacity of voluntary self-
regulatory measures to address the regulatory gaps revealed by the crisis and often 
replaced them with mandatory regulatory requirements.  
In order to put this change in the proper context, this essay will start by analyzing in 
Section II the evolution of the public-private divide in the regulation of global finance 
from a historical perspective, focusing in particular on the regulatory paradigm that has 
emerged since the 1990s. Section III will move instead to the extensive regulatory 
reforms that have been triggered by the global financial crisis of 2007-09, focusing in 
particular on three cases: OTC derivatives markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge 
funds.4 While the regulatory response to global financial crisis could be regarded as one 
of the most dramatic turning point in public-private divide in the regulation of finance 
since the 1930s, this represents in many cases primarily a shift in the location of the rule-
making authority - from private market actors to public regulatory agencies – rather than 
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in the content and purpose of regulation. The conclusion to this paper will thus argue that 
the purpose and content of the regulatory intervention presents significant element of 
continuity with the pre-crisis regulatory model, and a paradigmatic change in the purpose 
of regulatory intervention has yet to appear. 
 
 
II. Before the crisis: the new paradigm in the regulation of finance 
 
A The public-private divide from a historical perspective 
From a historical perspective, the involvement of state actors in the regulation and 
supervision of financial markets is quite a recent development. The rules that initially 
brought order to international transactions found their origin in the so-called lex 
mercatoria, the customs of those merchants who were the first to provide credit within 
and across the borders of the emerging nation-states. These rules were enforced through 
the threat of ostracism from the merchant community and of boycotting of all future 
trades. The predominance of private rule-making in the regulation of finance endured and 
reached its height during the ‘first wave of globalisation’ at the end of the XIXth and 
early XXth century. At this time, both the most important financial centre in the world 
(London) and its emerging challenger (New York) maintained powerful self-governing 
corporatist institutions, such as the London Stock Exchange, the Corporation of Lloyds, 
and the New York Stock Exchange. Self-regulatory arrangements also governed other 
corners of the financial system, like commercial bank clearinghouses, payments and 
securities settlement systems, and interbank deposit markets.5 
It is only after the First World War and the Great Depression that the governments in the 
most industrialized countries widened their intervention in the regulation of finance. 
During this period, governments intervened to place restrictions on the activities of 
financial market participants (eg Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 restricting the freedom of US 
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banks to operate in the securities markets) and to create new domestic regulatory 
institutions (eg creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee self-
regulatory organizations, such as stock exchanges).6  
These reforms represent a watershed in the public-private divide, as states took upon 
themselves the task of preventing the disruptive effects demonstrated by currency and 
banking crises of the Great Depression. Nonetheless, private market actors were not 
completely stripped away of their regulatory functions. According to Moran, the 
reconstruction of the financial systems in the United States and the United Kingdom after 
the Wall Street Crash of 1929 relied on an extensive network of self-regulatory 
organizations, in particular in the regulation of securities markets and stock exchanges, 
which were granted by the state the license to govern their activities through a ‘charter’ 
defining their duties and rights.7   
As several scholars have argued,8 the fifteen years or so preceding the financial crisis of 
2007-09 have witnessed a partial ‘return to the past’, as the division of regulatory 
functions between ‘public’ regulatory agencies and ‘private’ market actors shifted in 
favour of the latter.  
While from an historical perspective self-regulation had been the norm in sectors such as 
securities markets and stock exchanges, in the years preceding the crisis self-regulatory 
initiatives were institutionalized into a larger number of financial sectors. For instance, 
industry self-regulatory initiatives from the main derivatives dealers have provided the 
legal background against which the growing volumes of transactions have flourished 
outside of regulated exchanges, also known as ‘over the counter’ markets. After the 
collapse of the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, self-regulatory 
measures adopted by hedge fund groups and by their bank counterparties have become 
the most important regulatory mechanism to reduce the systemic risk posed by the 
industry. In the case of rating agencies, while the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
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2006 put an end to the self-regulatory status of the industry in the United States, they 
continued to remain self-regulated in Europe and elsewhere.  
Moreover, what differentiated these self-regulatory initiatives from those in place since 
the 1930s in countries such as the UK and US was their transnational dimension. 
Underpinning this shift of self-regulation from a national to transnational dimension was 
the emergence at the global level of a restricted number of transnational financial 
industry associations composed of internationally-oriented firms or high-profile 
individuals capable of drafting voluntary self-regulatory initiatives whose scope 
transcended the national boundaries.9  In the case of OTC derivatives, crucial self-
regulatory initiatives have been developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), and other industry groups such as Futures Industry Association, the 
Emerging Markets Traders Association, the Derivatives Policy Group, and a private 
organization/think tank such as the G30.10 Groups such as the Managed Funds 
Association, Alternative Investment Funds Associations, and Hedge Fund Standards 
Board have taken the lead in developing self-regulatory mechanisms for hedge fund 
managers, while their bank counterparties have coalesced into the Counterparty Risk 
Management Policy Group. 
While these developments at the turn of the century have enhanced the importance of 
private rule-making in governing global financial markets to an extent not seen since the 
‘first wave of globalization’ that preceded the Great Depression, it would be misleading 
to regard this shift in the public-private divide as simply a ‘return to the past’.11 
Instead, there is a fundamental difference between the self-regulation in international 
finance during the ‘first wave of globalization’ and the ‘second wave of globalization’. 
While the former preceded the rise of state-based regulation, the revived importance of 
self-regulation in the latter has taken place against a background of international 
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regulatory agencies that had been created by states since the 1970s to coordinate their 
domestic regulatory policies.  
 
B A new paradigm in the regulation of finance 
The shift in the public-private divide in the years preceding the global financial crisis has 
been the outcome of two complementary sets of policy choices taken by state actors. 
First, in the period preceding the crisis public regulatory authorities have in some cases 
refrained from extending the perimeter of their regulatory oversight and to claim 
regulatory power over innovative markets and instruments. When different episodes of 
financial instability in the 1990s and early 2000s put OTC derivatives markets, hedge 
funds, and credit rating agencies on the agenda of international regulatory bodies, the 
recommendations released by these bodies did not seek to put in the hands of public 
regulatory authorities the responsibility to regulate and supervise these markets and 
institutions.  
In the case of derivatives, the recommendations released by the Basel Committee and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1994, after several 
corporate scandals involving the use of derivatives, endorsed only a very limited 
involvement of regulators over the part of market remaining outside of regulated 
exchanges.12 While in Europe a comprehensive regulation of OTC derivatives never 
emerged, the US Congress went even further, introducing in 2000 a legislation to exempt 
many kinds of derivatives from federal oversight.13  
A similar outcome characterized the regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies. 
When hedge funds entered the regulatory agenda after the collapse of the US-based fund 
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, European and US authorities comprising the 
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Financial Stability Forum discussed but ultimately failed to agree on the desirability of 
directly regulating and supervising these investment vehicles.14  
Credit rating agencies were brought in the international regulatory agenda by the collapse 
of Enron in 2001. In response to this scandal, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) drafted in 2004 a set of best practices for rating agencies to 
uphold, without openly recommending national regulatory authorities to take 
responsibility for enforce compliance with these rules.15 Whereas in the United States 
Congress forced this task upon regulators through the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006, in Europe the securities regulators and the European Commission rejected the 
hypothesis of following a similar path and introducing a mandatory ‘European 
Registration Scheme’. They decided instead to leave the industry outside of the scope of 
their direct regulatory oversight.16  
The decision to allow OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds to continue to 
operate outside the public regulatory umbrella was frequently justified by regulatory 
authorities on the ground that market actors in OTC derivatives markets or investing in 
hedge funds were sufficiently wealthy and sophisticated. Extending the public regulatory 
oversight over these markets was described as generating moral hazard, inducing 
investors to reduce their due diligence, stifling innovation and increasing compliance 
costs.  
However, it would be a mistake to equate this trend as simply a process of deregulation. 
On the contrary, the fifteen years that preceded the financial crisis of 2007-09 coincided 
with a proliferation of codes of best practices and other regulatory initiatives drafted by 
international regulatory bodies.  
It is thus important to highlight a second set of policy choices that informed the pre-crisis 
shift in the public-private divide, that is, a shift in the purpose and content of regulation 
                                                        
14
 FSF, 'Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions' (Financial Stability Forum, April 2000). For an 
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away from directly regulating what market participants could and could not do through 
orders and prohibitions, towards seeking to harness the ‘invisible hand’ of markets in 
support of their regulatory objectives.      
Informing this shift was the view expressed in particular by the Federal Reserve in the 
US that that the capacity of public regulatory authorities to regulate effectively innovative 
markets was constrained by their complexity and innovative nature of these markets.  At 
the same time, several regulators and economists argued that these constraints in the 
public regulatory power could be mitigated by leveraging the same market forces.17 
While the discipline imposed by regulators was described as ‘rule-based, episodic, 
bureaucratic and slow to change’, market discipline was described as ‘forward-looking 
and inherently flexible and adaptive … continuous, impersonal and non-bureaucratic’,18 
capable of preserving financial stability without stifling innovation or posing unnecessary 
costs that could damage the competitiveness of financial firms.  
Two strategies have been pursued during this period by regulatory authorities to harness 
market forces in support of their regulatory. First, international regulatory bodies have 
frequently sought to take advantage of the supposed greater flexibility and sensitivity to 
market developments of industry self-regulation by providing their seal of approval to the 
codes of best practices drafted by financial industry associations and incorporating them 
into their international regulatory initiatives. Moreover in those cases where industry-
driven initiatives were inadequate or non-existing, they have not hesitated to solicit 
industry groups to revise the existing self-regulatory initiatives or to draft new ones, often 
relying on the threat of introducing formal regulation in the case the private sector had 
failed to meet regulators’ expectations. For instance, the report published by the FSF on 
the regulation of hedge funds called upon the hedge fund industry to draft a set of sound 
practices to improve risk management, internal controls, and disclosure of relevant 
information to their counterparties. In 2007 the FSF renewed its calls on the hedge fund 
industry to review the existing sound practice benchmarks for hedge fund managers in 
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the light of expectations set out by regulators and market participants.19 In the case of 
credit rating agencies, IOSCO relied on the voluntary incorporation by rating agencies 
into their own internal self-regulatory schemes of its international codes of conduct for 
rating agencies.   
International regulatory bodies have also sought to leverage the self-regulatory skills of 
financial actors in support of their policy objectives also at the firm-level. Traditional 
command and control policies seeking to correct market failures by ensuring the 
compliance with standardized norms of behavior have ceded ground to regulatory 
policies granting a greater degree of freedom and flexibility to the operations of private 
market actors in order to promote their self-regulatory capabilities and encourage 
financial innovation.20 This shift has been documented by several scholars who have 
studied the evolution of the international capital requirement regime for banking 
institutions set by Basel Committee.21 While the first 1988 Basel Capital Agreement 
established a rigid relationship between banks’ exposures and the amount of reserve 
capital they were required to put aside, the Basel II Agreement completed in 2004 
allowed the most sophisticated banks to use their own data and risk-management schemes 
to determine their risk exposure and the amount of reserve capital they were required to 
retain. 
     In a similar way, the guidelines drafted by the Basel Committee and IOSCO on OTC 
derivatives markets sought to assist national authorities in promoting sound risk 
management practices for market actors involved in these markets. The FSF put at the 
core of its recommendations the attempt to promote stronger risk management by hedge 
funds and to strengthen credit risk assessment, exposure measurement methodologies, 
and collateral procedures from hedge funds’ counterparties. IOSCO’s code of conduct for 
credit rating agencies also focused on strengthening the capacity of rating agencies to 
manage the conflicts of interest involved in the rating business.  
Second, international regulatory bodies have not relied on market actors uniquely as rule-
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makers, but also as monitoring and disciplining devices. International regulatory have 
frequently relied on the capacity of markets to monitor changes in a financial firms 
activities by replacing standardized regulatory requirements with market-based measures 
of value and risk (e.g. security prices, credit ratings). In particular, the ratings published 
by commercial credit rating agencies came to be incorporated in several important 
regulatory initiatives, such as in the determination of capital requirements for banking 
institutions under the Basel II agreement, the determination of eligible investments or 
asset concentrations, or the measurement of credit risk associated with certain 
securities.22 Beyond this indirect market monitoring function, regulators have also relied 
on the direct market influence of private counterparties to penalize excessive risk-taking 
without the need for an intervention by supervisors, simply by virtue of changing their 
investment decisions.23  
Therefore, at the same time as they were scaling back the extent of their regulatory 
oversight, regulators have actively used their ‘visible hand’ to create an environment 
conducive for private counterparties to perform this monitoring and steering function. 
The primary mechanism to achieve this goal has been the imposition upon financial firms 
of disclosure requirements to enhance the transparency of certain markets.24 Disclosure 
requirements have been a central piece in the toolkit of financial regulators since the first 
half of the XXth century. However in the fifteen years preceding the crisis their use has 
increasingly gone beyond the prevention of frauds and abuses in securities markets, and 
they have increasingly been employed in the context of prudential regulatory policies to 
reinforce financial stability.25   
The elevation of ‘market discipline’ in the Basel II Agreement as a ‘third pillar’ besides 
capital requirements and supervisory policies represents an example of the prominent role 
that market pressures have come to play as a monitoring and enforcement mechanism in 
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international regulatory policies.26 However, prior to the crisis market discipline has 
occupied an even more central part in the international regulatory policies designed to 
regulate rating agencies, hedge funds, and OTC derivatives markets. For instance, 
IOSCO required rating agencies to disclose publicly how they had incorporated its ‘Code 
of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’ into their internal guidelines and 
explain any deviation from it in order to allow the users of ratings to monitor the monitor 
the implementation of these international best practices and punish those agencies not 
complying with international best practices. Also in the case of hedge funds, the approach 
advanced by the FSF and adopted in Europe and in the US was based on the principle 
that the task of monitoring hedge funds’ activities should not be performed by regulators, 
but rather by hedge funds’ investors and prime-brokers, who were described as having 
stronger incentives to monitor hedge funds’ positions and greater resources than those 
available to regulators. The recommendations released by the FSF thus focused on 
strengthening the disclosure of information regarding hedge funds’ activities to their 
private counterparties, rather than the private reporting of this information to the 
supervisory authorities. 
In sum, the shift in the public-private divide that has emerged in international finance 
prior to the last financial crisis should be regarded not simply as an example of 
deregulation, but rather the emergence of a new regulatory paradigm.  Andrew Crockett, 
former General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, has argued that a 
‘paradigm shift’ has occurred in the approach taken by financial regulators, who are 
increasingly attempting ‘to work with, rather than against, the grain of market forces’ in 
their approach to the regulation of financial markets.27 The former Chairman Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa talked instead of the emergence of ‘market-friendly regulation’.28  
This trend is in line with the growing importance that self-regulation and other market-
based regulatory solutions have gained in the ‘global administrative law’29 emerging to 
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address the consequences of globalization in different areas. Despite, this trend has 
frequently been interpreted as a death knell for the state, this view is misleading. As 
several authors have more recently acknowledged, the development of self-regulation in 
the global economy has frequently taken place ‘in the shadow of public power’.30 As this 
section has argued, also in the case of global financial regulation the enhanced power of 
private market actors in setting and enforcing the rules governing finance rested on a set 
of policy choices by state actors in the main countries. As the analysis of the changes 
brought by the financial crisis of 2007-09 in the next section will demonstrate, these same 
public actors also held the keys for reversing this trend and seizing back the regulatory 
responsibilities they had delegated to markets.   
   
 
 
 
III. After the crisis: The reassertion of public regulation 
In the years preceding the crisis, several scholars have provided different hypotheses to 
explain the origin of this shift in the relation between public and private actors in the 
governance of financial markets described above. Several authors argued that this 
delegation of regulatory responsibilities to the markets reflected the growing constraints 
posed by financial globalization and innovation upon the capacity of public actors to 
effectively govern financial markets.31 Others raised the attention towards the central role 
played by American and British regulatory authorities in shaping the international agenda 
and their interest in leaving their firms dominating world markets free from the 
burdensome regulatory measures.32 Some authors identified the origin of this shift in the 
preferences of financial industry groups, and their capacity to capture the regulatory 
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process not only at the national level but also at the transnational level.33 Finally, for 
others this capture was primarily ideological, and it reflected the influence within the 
international regulatory community – in particular the Federal Reserve headed by Alan 
Greenspan and the British Financial Services Authority - of an ideational consensus 
stressing the efficient and rational nature of financial markets.34  
While pointing in the direction of different causal explanations, most of these 
interpretations tended to describe the shift in the public-private divide as a structural 
change in the evolution of financial markets, unlikely to be reversed in the future. Among 
the few exceptions was Louis Pauly who argued forcefully in 2003 that the delegation of 
regulatory authority to private market actors in the global economy remained a fleeting 
phenomenon. According to Pauly, public authority would likely reassert control over 
what they had delegated to private actors in the case of a financial crisis or a phenomenon 
seriously delegitimizing market mechanisms.35 
This possibility has manifested itself in a dramatic fashion during the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. This event has shaken the political foundations that underpinned the 
pre-crisis delegation of regulatory responsibilities to the private sector and unleashed 
political dynamics different from those faced by the pre-crisis literature. In particular, the 
use of taxpayers’ money in support of financial institutions has triggered an 
unprecedented politicization of financial regulatory politics. This has shifted the centre of 
the action away from those regulatory agencies that before the crisis remained more 
prone to be captured by the financial industry and raised the profile of elected 
policymakers who faced now strong electoral incentives to demonstrate to their electorate 
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their commitment to not lead crucial regulatory responsibilities in the hands of those 
same private market actors that had contributed to the crisis.36 
The rest of this paper will analyze how these largely unprecedented political dynamics 
had the effect of reversing the shift in the public-private divide that took place since the 
1990s in the international regulation of OTC derivatives, credit rating agencies, and 
hedge funds. These cases show that while the initial recommendations released by the 
G20, the Financial Stability Forum/Board and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions continued to focus on self-regulation and market-discipline as primary 
regulatory mechanisms, these international bodies have come to depart from the pre-crisis 
regulatory paradigm by placing these three markets and institutions firmly under the 
regulatory oversight of public regulatory authorities. 
 
A OTC Derivatives 
During the period preceding the crisis regulatory authorities in the US, Europe, and in the 
international standard-setting bodies had refrained from advocating an expansion in the 
perimeter of their regulatory oversight to incorporate the growing portion of derivatives 
traded over-the-counter (OTC), despite the fact that the size of these markets came to 
overshadow exchange-traded derivatives.37 Instead, regulatory authorities expressed 
significant confidence in the operational infrastructure created on a self-regulatory basis 
by the main market participants gathered in the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association. However, when the financial crisis erupted in 2007, it quickly became clear 
that this infrastructure had not kept pace with the explosion in the complexity of these 
instruments and the surging trading volumes.38   
The way these regulatory deficiencies were initially addressed presents significant 
similarities with the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm. Instead of requesting the power to 
directly address these regulatory gaps, US regulatory authorities under the leadership of 
                                                        
36
 E. Helleiner & S. Pagliari, 'The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global Financial 
Governance', in E. Helleiner, S. Pagliari, and H. Zimmermann. (eds),Global Finance in Crisis. The Politics of 
International Regulatory Change (Routledge, 2009). 
37
 A notable exception has been the Commodity Futures Trading Commission headed by Brooksley Born, who called 
for the regulation of OTC derivatives in 1999. 
38
  For an early warning, see PWG, 'Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments' (President's Working Group 
on Financial Markets, March 2008). 
 16 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in coordination with their main European 
counterparts convened the main derivatives markets participants in a series of closed-
door meetings and presented specific requests to be met through further self-regulatory 
steps.39 
Derivatives markets participants have been rapid in responding to the detailed requests 
coming from regulators. Since March 2008, they have committed to increase the 
standardization and enhance the processing of derivatives traded over-the-counter, 
improve collateral management, report all credit derivatives to a central ‘trade 
repository’, reduce the volume of outstanding credit derivatives trades by tearing up 
contracts that have essentially opposite positions over the same risk, increase the 
certainty and transparency of a settlement process following a corporate default or 
another ‘credit event’ by ‘hardwiring’ an auction-based settlement mechanism into 
standard derivatives contracts (Big Bang Protocol). 
Most importantly, when the collapse of Lehman Brothers demonstrated the systemic 
effects of the collapse of a major counterparty in the derivatives markets, regulators urged 
market participants to mitigate the counterparty risk in OTC derivatives transactions by 
redirecting these flows through central counterparties where bilateral trades could be 
cleared. While in the US regulators quickly achieved the commitment by the main dealers 
eager to avoid more formal regulation, in Europe the relation between public authorities 
and private market actors has been more difficult. The European Commission was able to 
achieve the commitment by the major derivative dealers to clear derivatives through a 
central counterparty located in Europe only by threatening to impose higher capital 
requirements on derivatives not processed through a European clearing house.40  
Despite the fact that the regulatory changes in OTC derivatives markets during the first 
two years of the crisis were as extensive as those occurred in the entire previous decade, 
it is important to note that these reforms remained voluntary and self-regulatory in nature, 
with the role of public authorities confined to steering these industry-driven initiatives 
through carrots and sticks.   
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It was only after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the bailout 
of the insurance giant AIG that the European Commission and the US Treasury departed 
from the first-pillar of the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm by introducing comprehensive 
regulatory plans to bring the regulation and supervision of OTC derivative markets firmly 
under the regulatory oversight of public regulatory agencies. The European Commission 
described this as a ‘paradigm shift … away from the traditional view that derivatives are 
financial instruments for professional use, for which light-handed regulation was thought 
sufficient, towards an approach where legislation allows markets to price risks 
properly’.41  
At the core of these regulatory initiatives was the attempt to shift derivative markets from 
predominantly OTC bilateral transactions, where regulators have little to no oversight, to 
more centralised clearinghouses or trading platforms under the oversight of financial 
regulators and subject to binding regulatory requirements. In the first stage of the crisis, 
regulators saw their role as simply that of ‘encouraging’ this step, often through the threat 
of formal legislation. At the first G20 leaders summit in Washington in November 2008 
the G20 leaders asked regulators to ‘insist that market participants support exchange 
traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS contracts’.42 However, since the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers most public regulatory authorities in Europe and in the US have 
announced their support for making central clearing and exchange trading mandatory for 
standardized OTC contracts. At the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, G20 leaders 
stated more categorically that ‘all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded 
on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest.’43   
While this represents a significant expansion in the intervention of regulators in these 
markets, the use of the ‘visible hand’ of regulation did not go as far as many 
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policymakers and commentators have advocated. For instance, instead of mandating the 
trading onto exchanges of all derivatives contracts, the US and European regulatory plans 
continue to allow ‘non-standardized’ derivatives to be traded over-the-counter. At the 
same time, they seek to enhance the information available on these markets by mandating 
the reporting of all OTC contracts to trade repositories, and they impose higher prudential 
requirements for counterparties in non-centrally cleared derivatives transactions in order 
to create incentives to migrate of OTC derivatives onto central clearinghouses and 
exchanges. Moreover, both the US Congress and the European Commission plan have 
introduced significant exemptions from mandatory clearing and exchange trading for 
many of those corporate end-users that use OTC derivatives to hedge their commercial 
risk, after intense lobbying from these same market players.  
During the Greek debt crisis several policymakers have also called for the banning of so-
called ‘naked’ credit default swaps, where the buyer of the credit insurance does not own 
the underlying asset on which the credit insurance was purchased. However, this kind of 
proposal has not been incorporated into the US and European regulatory plans, which 
have not gone as far as posing limits to the kind of derivatives could be traded.    
In sum, while the regulatory response to the financial crisis has consolidated in the hands 
of public regulatory agencies in Europe and elsewhere the authority to regulate OTC 
derivatives markets and channeled a significant portion of these markets through central 
clearinghouses, they have been wary of expanding their regulatory intervention to the 
extent that it significantly curtail these markets, or limit the access of corporate end-users 
to OTC derivatives markets. 
 
B Credit Rating Agencies 
The financial crisis of 2007-09 has also brought the regulation of credit rating agencies 
back under the spotlight. The immediate acknowledgment of how rating agencies had 
severely underestimated the risks attached to mortgage back securities and other 
structured finance products led IOSCO to amend in 2008 its ‘Code of Conduct 
 19 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’.44 Similarly to the first set of best practices 
drafted in 2004, the amended Code of Conduct remained non-binding, relying on ratings 
agencies to voluntarily incorporate these recommendations into their individual codes of 
conduct, and on discipline imposed by the users of ratings as the unique mechanism to 
ensure compliance.   
However, the reliance on market discipline and self-regulation progressively came under 
severe criticisms throughout 2008. Primarily, it was European policymakers who led the 
charge, with the Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy defining the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct a ‘toothless wonder’.45 In a public consultation launched in 2008 on the 
regulation of rating agencies, the European Commission argued that the oligopolistic 
structure of the rating agencies’ market did not allow market participants to switch to 
other rating providers, thus making it ‘highly unlikely that market pressure alone is 
sufficient to discipline the CRAs to change their conduct.’46 The Commission also 
dismissed the different self-regulatory measures taken by different rating agencies, 
arguing that ‘most of these have not been robust and or stringent enough to cope with the 
severe problems and restore the confidence in the markets’, while still lacking a credible 
enforcement mechanism.47 
The crisis has thus gradually shifted the responsibility to monitor and enforce compliance 
with the IOSCO code of conduct from market pressures to the hands of public regulatory 
authorities.  At the Washington Summit on November 2008, G20 leaders asked regulators 
to ‘review credit rating agencies’ adoption of the standards and mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance’.48 IOSCO supported this goal by developing a ‘common 
monitoring module’ to assist supervisors in monitoring compliance with its Code of 
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Conduct,49 and endorsed the creation of colleges of regulators or bilateral regulatory 
arrangements that could help regulators in the supervision of the largest CRAs that 
operate across borders.50 
While these measures sought strengthen the capacity of public authorities to monitor the 
self-regulatory measures taken by rating agencies to incorporate the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct into their internal practices, IOSCO did not place public authorities in charge of 
directly regulating rating agencies and sanctioning non-compliance. This approach was 
openly criticized at the international level by the G20. The G20 Working Group on 
‘Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency’ that was convened after 
the Washington Summit presented in March 2009 an explicit criticism of the self-
regulatory status of credit rating agencies: ‘a self-regulatory framework does not appear 
sufficient to ensure compliance with the IOSCO Code … Effective supervision requires 
surveillance of CRAs' activities and, where necessary, enforcement of rules applying to 
CRAs’.51 
G20 leaders took another step towards increasing the role of financial regulators in the 
regulation of rating agencies when at the Washington Summit they requested credit rating 
agencies that provide public ratings to be registered.52 The significance of this shift in the 
public-private divide was acknowledged also by IOSCO, which stated in May 2010, ‘a 
consensus emerged that the IOSCO CRA Code, as an industry code that promoted CRAs 
to implement internal controls and processes designed to give effect to the IOSCO CRA 
Principles, should be supplemented with regulation of CRAs by national competent 
authorities.’53  
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While regulators in the US had already been granted this authority by the CRA Reform 
Act of 2006, this was not the case in Europe and other jurisdictions. The European 
Commission has reestablished a regulatory level playing field with the US by introducing 
in 2008 a comprehensive regulatory framework requiring all rating agencies issuing 
ratings intended for use for regulatory purposes by financial institutions in the EU to 
register with European regulators.54 Other countries such as Japan, South Korea, and 
Australia have followed the European lead and announced the introduction of similar 
regulatory frameworks placing in the hands of securities regulators the authority to 
impose regulatory requirements upon rating monitoring their implementation, and 
sanctioning episodes of non-compliance.55  
At the same time, a deeper analysis of the content of the regulation introduced in Europe 
and the amendment to the existing regulation introduced in the United States 
demonstrates significant elements of continuity with the pre-crisis regulatory approach. 
For instance, despite the fact that the crisis has revealed significant shortcomings in the 
methodologies employed by rating agencies in rating structured finance products, both 
the regulatory proposals presented in the US and Europe have refrained from placing 
public regulators in change of monitoring and validating the methodologies employed by 
rating agencies, defining which instruments could be rated and which level of due 
diligence should be conducted on the assets underlying a rating, or to second guess the 
performance of their ratings. Instead, regulators have remained wary that such measures 
would put them in the position to validate the operation of rating agencies, creating moral 
hazard and exacerbating over-reliance on ratings. They have thus addressed this issue 
primarily by requesting rating agencies to provide to the market more information 
regarding their ratings’ historical performance, the assumptions and methodologies, the 
level of due diligence on the assets underlying a structured finance product they rate, as 
well as to differentiate ratings for structured finance products from ratings for corporate 
and sovereign bonds. These disclosure requirements were designed to assist market 
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participants in understanding the limitations and implication of ratings and conduct ‘what 
if’ analyses. The legislation passed by the US Congress (Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010) has also departed from the principle that the ratings 
should be granted protection from lawsuits under the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution, and introduced a provision that would make it easier for investors sue rating 
agencies. 
Also the approach pursued in the US and Europe to address the conflicts of interest 
deriving from the fact that rating agencies are paid by the issuers of the security they are 
rating presents a strong continuity with the market-based regulatory paradigm that 
emerged prior to the crisis. Regulators have sought to mitigate the conflicts of interests in 
the rating business by introducing an additional set of disclosure requirements regarding 
their conflicts of interests, the polices in place to manage these conflicts of interests, and 
the preliminary ratings obtained from a credit rating agency prior to selecting a firm to 
conduct a rating in order to prevent issuers from ‘shopping’ among multiple agencies in 
search for the highest rating. These disclosure requirements were strengthened by 
prohibitions, such as barring analysts from engaging on advisory services and making 
recommendations regarding the design of structured finance products they rate, and from 
participating in fee discussions with issuers, and by limited internal governance 
requirements (e.g. rotation arrangements for analysts, composition of their boards of 
directors). However, regulators in Europe and in the US have not severed the link 
between raters and issuers. Proposals presented in the US to create a public ‘rating 
clearinghouse’ that would severe the direct link between agencies and issuers of 
structured products, or in Europe to create a public ‘European rating agency’ had not 
much success beyond simply calls for further study on the viability of such wholesale 
changes in the way rating agencies are funded. Instead, as the US Treasury stated, the 
role of public regulators that emerges from these regulations is not ‘to prescribe 
allowable business models in the free market’, but rather ‘to make it simple for investors 
to understand the conflicts in any rating that they read and allow them to make their own 
judgment of its relevance to their investment decision’.56 
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An important sign of discontinuity from the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm comes from 
the attempt of regulators to use their authority to reduce the excessive reliance on ratings 
by market actors as a replacement for adequate risk analysis and risk-management. 
Before the crisis ratings were frequently hard-wired in the existing regulatory framework 
through numerous references to credit ratings in regulatory requirements guiding 
different market actors. In order to lessen undue reliance on ratings, the SEC has removed 
references to credit ratings in different parts of securities laws. The European 
Commission has published a consultation report regarding the ‘policy options to address 
the problem of excessive reliance on credit ratings’.57 At the international level, the G20 
has asked the Basel Committee to correct the incentives arising from the use in the Basel 
II agreement of external ratings or other market-based measures of value and risk, such 
value-at-risk (VaR) estimates,58 thus reversing the reliance on market-based measures of 
price and risk in regulation that had characterized the regulatory paradigm prior to the 
crisis. 
   
C Hedge Funds 
Similarly to the case of OTC derivatives and rating agencies described above, the 
outbreak of the crisis did not initially undermine the support for industry-driven codes of 
best practices and market-based regulatory solutions that had characterized the regulation 
of hedge funds since the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. On the 
contrary, at the outset of the crisis the major European leaders all gave their seal of 
approval to the self-regulatory initiatives drafted by a group of London-based hedge 
funds (Hedge Fund Standards Board), including the German government that had 
traditionally been the most vocal in calling for directly regulating these investment 
vehicles.59 In the US, federal regulatory agencies took upon themselves the task of 
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creating two advisory groups formed respectively by hedge funds managers and investors 
with the mandate of creating a private sector-driven set of best practices.60 
When hedge funds reached the international agenda for the first time in the middle of the 
crisis at the G20 Washington Summit, the G20 leaders reached out to the same hedge 
fund bodies that had already developed codes of best practices, asking them to ‘bring 
forward proposals for a set of unified best practices’. The role of public authorities as 
envisioned by the G20 was limited to ‘assess[ing] the adequacy of these proposals’.61 As 
in the case of past episodes of financial instability, these calls from regulators have 
triggered the reaction from major hedge funds groups, which have committed to fostering 
convergence between different industry best practices and delivering to the FSB a set of 
harmonised Principles of Best Practices for Hedge Fund Managers on 24 June 2009.62  
However, these self-regulatory steps taken by the hedge fund industry have generated 
only lukewarm reactions from public authorities. Securities regulators gathered within 
IOSCO have raised doubts about the effectiveness of industry codes of best practices as a 
substitute for direct regulation. First, IOSCO argued that the adoption by hedge fund 
managers of these industry codes of best practices had remained low, as demonstrated by 
a survey showing that only less than 10% of British hedge funds managers were prepared 
to sign up to the standards drafted by the HFWG,63 and there has been no demand by 
investors of these hedge funds to adopt the standards. Second, IOSCO denounced the 
variety of different industry standards covering different issues and the lack of a globally 
consistent solution. Third, IOSCO argued that there were ‘still open questions regarding 
the enforceability of such codes either by regulators or industry associations’.64  
While in the past industry-driven initiatives were successful in deflecting the threat of 
more stringent regulation, this time the outcome was different. When the G20 leaders met 
at London Summit on April 2009, they abandoned the long-standing international support 
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for self-regulation in the hedge fund industry and announced that ‘hedge funds or their 
managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on 
an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for 
assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively’.65 Building 
upon this international commitment, the European Commission presented in April 2009 a 
directive (Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive) requiring hedge fund 
managers to seek authorization with a national regulator and be subject to reporting, 
governance, and risk management requirements in order to operate in Europe.66 A similar 
shift from self-regulation to direct regulation has taken place in the US, where Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has removed those exemptions from 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that allowed advisers to hedge funds to avoid 
registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission.   
By mandating the registration of hedge funds managers with a national regulatory 
authority and requiring them to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis, 
these regulatory plans represent a significant departure from the pre-crisis regulatory 
paradigm and they place firmly in the hands of public authorities the primary 
responsibility to regulate and supervise hedge funds’ activities. However, the regulation 
that has emerged could be better described as ‘enhanced oversight’ of hedge funds 
managers than a ‘granular approach’ to closely regulating and constraining their 
investment activities.67 
Similarly to the pre-crisis paradigm, at the core of the emerging regulation of hedge funds 
there is the attempt to enhance the level of transparency in the industry. The regulatory 
plans presented by the European Commission and US Treasury require hedge fund 
managers to provide information regarding the identity of their funds, their internal 
governance arrangements and key service providers, as well as their trading activities, 
including information on the principal markets and instruments in which they trade, their 
principal exposures and concentrations, the use of short-selling, the overall level of 
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leverage. While before the crisis these disclosure requirements were targeted exclusively 
to the markets in order to enhance market discipline, disclosure requirements are now 
meant to assist the same regulatory authorities to police hedge funds and to identify 
market abuses (eg insider trading and market manipulation), as well as to assess the 
systemic risk they pose to the financial system.  
The approach emerging from the crisis to the regulation of hedge funds also extends the 
visible hand of regulatory agencies to influence the internal organization and operational 
conduct of the funds. Hedge fund managers operating in Europe and in the US would 
have to comply to various regulatory requirements regarding their internal policies to 
manage conflicts of interest, asset safekeeping and valuation arrangements, risk-
management mechanisms, and remuneration.  
However, these regulatory frameworks have been cautious in extending the ‘visible hand’ 
of regulators as far as interfering with hedge funds’ market activities. While some 
Continental European authorities called for the imposition of prudential regulatory 
requirements similar to those imposed upon banks, the US regulatory plan includes 
neither the introduction of capital requirements nor of a cap on leverage for non-
systemically relevant hedge funds. The cap on hedge funds’ leverage that was introduced 
in the directive initially presented by the European Commission was later removed from 
the text, and European authorities retain the power to limit the level of leverage only 
under exceptional circumstances Moreover, none of the regulatory initiatives described 
above impose restrictions on the capacity of hedge fund managers to employ short-selling 
techniques or to their use of derivatives, nor they impose any position or concentration 
limits. In sum, similarly to the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm, these regulatory proposals 
continue to regard the discipline imposed by the banks that provide hedge funds with 
credit as the primary line of defense to constrain excessive leverage and risk-taking in 
hedge funds’ activities. At the same time, it must be remarked how both in Europe and in 
the US regulators have now been granted the statutory authority to intervene and impose 
restrictions on hedge funds’ activities in those situations where market discipline fails and 
hedge funds come to pose systemic risk to the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Scholars and policymakers have frequently drawn parallels between the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 and the Wall Street crash of 1929. Both shocks came after a decade 
of financial innovation and enthusiasm in the financial markets, and imposed a hefty toll 
on the world economy. This paper has suggested that another parallel could be found in 
the regulatory response. Both financial shocks have led public authorities to increase their 
involvement in the regulation of financial markets and significantly altered the divide 
between public regulatory agencies and private market actors.  
The regulatory initiatives described in this paper represent a significant departure from 
the regulatory approach that gained prominence in the decade or so prior to the crisis. 
During this period, regulators refrained from extending the perimeter of their regulatory 
oversight over OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds. The crisis has reversed 
this position. By mandating the registration of hedge fund managers and rating agencies 
whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes, by shifting a large part of derivatives 
contracts traded bilaterally into regulated central counterparties, and by imposing 
regulatory requirements upon market actors engaging in transactions over-the-counter, 
the commitments made at the international level within transgovernmental regulatory 
bodies such FSF/B and IOSCO, or a leaders forum such as the G20 clearly placed in the 
hand of public actors the authority to set standards governing these three markets and 
institutions.  
Another significant departure from the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm comes from the 
very limited endorsement given to self-regulatory initiatives designed by financial 
industry groups as a legitimate substitute for regulatory initiatives set and enforced by 
public regulatory agencies. This is not to say that the self-regulatory steps taken by the 
key market participants did not leave a mark over the regulatory response to the crisis. 
For instance, the operational infrastructures that support the OTC derivatives markets 
continue to be primarily the product of self-regulatory efforts developed under the aegis 
of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. In other areas, the emerging 
public regulation has built upon self-regulatory measures already introduced voluntarily 
by market participants. However, public regulatory agencies made these measures 
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mandatory and backed them up with the coercive authority of the state. In general, while 
elements of self-regulation remain in the regulation of these sectors, they now sit on top, 
rather than replace, a regulatory framework set and enforced by public regulatory 
agencies. 
From this perspective, the reassertion of public regulation over a large number of markets 
and institutions that remained outside of the public regulatory umbrella represents the 
most significant turning point in the way responsibilities to regulate financial markets are 
divided between public and private actors since the 1930s. At the same time, several 
commentators have downplayed the significance of some of these changes. These have 
been described as simply tweaking at the margin, without fundamentally altering the 
purpose of the intervention of public actors in the regulation of market activities and the 
relation between public and private market actors.  
Indeed, the analysis presented above provides some support to this skeptical 
interpretation. When we analyze how public regulators have used their newly acquired 
regulatory authority to address the market failures highlighted by the crisis in these three 
areas, there are several elements of continuity with the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm. 
During the crisis we have seen regulators significantly reduce the degree of discretion 
enjoyed by the regulated private market actors. At the same time, market discipline and 
industry self-regulation remain important components in the attempt to re-regulate OTC 
derivatives markets, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies.  
A close analysis of these regulatory measures shows that the kind of shift along the 
public-private divide triggered by the financial crisis of 2007-09 is very different from the 
one that followed the Wall Street Crash of 1929. In response to the Wall Street crash of 
1929, public authorities in the major industrialized countries extended the use of the 
visible hand of regulation to prohibit some of the financial instruments created before the 
crisis, to restrict the freedom of banks to operate in the securities industry, and to 
discourage financial innovation. In response to the global financial crisis of 2007-09, 
public authorities have been wary of subduing or restricting the access to certain markets 
and products, often justifying this choice with the costs that such forms of regulation 
would pose upon the broader economy. The invisible hand of market discipline remains 
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thus an important ally in the attempt to re-regulate OTC derivatives markets, hedge funds, 
and credit rating agencies.  
In sum, while the global financial crisis of 2007-09 has significantly altered the public-
private divide in the regulation of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds, this 
shift pertains more to the consolidation of the authority to regulate and oversee these 
markets and institutions in the hands of public regulatory than a change in the purpose 
and content of their regulatory intervention. At the time of writing, a paradigm change in 
the regulation of finance similar to the one that followed the Wall Street crash of 1929 
does not seem be on the horizon. 
   
 
  
   
